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ABSTRACT 
 
Type B radioactive material package failures can occur 
due to any one of the following: inadequate design, 
manufacture, and maintenance of packages, load 
conditions beyond those anticipated in the regulations, and 
improper package loading and operation.  The rigorous 
package design evaluations performed in the certification 
process, robust package manufacture quality assurance 
programs, and demanding load conditions prescribed in 
the regulations are all well established.  This paper focuses 
on the operational aspects of Type B package loading with 
respect to an overbatch which may cause a package 
failure.    
 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 
Previous work by the authors examined the regulatory 
status of Type B package material contents compliance 
[1].  The emphasis was on evaluating existing regulations 
and guidance documents.  The authors proposed using a 
graded approach where minor content deviations from the 
Certified Package contents envelopes could be resolved 
much like minor manufacture deviations which are 
controlled during package fabrication (i.e. by the package 
design agency without involvement of a national 
competent authority).  Content attributes deemed essential 
to package safety, such as maximum allowed fissile mass 
or heat load, would be identified in the package Certificate 
of Compliance (CoC).  Transport of contents in excess of 
these limits would require approval of the national 
competent authority. 
 
Establishing the basis for the graded approach, that is 
identifying the content attributes of most interest, 
necessitates developing a relationship among these 
attributes and package safety - specifically radiological 
safety. 
 
II.  TYPE B PACKAGE RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY   
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A. Shielding 
Three sources of radiation are typically evaluated in Type 
B pacakges.  The first source is simply the radiation 
emitted by radioactive materials.  Radioactive materials 
emit alpha, beta, gamma and neutron radiation as they 
undergo radioactive decay.  The second source occurs 
when radiation from the originating isotope can interact 
within the content materials or with the packaging 
material to generate radiation.  For example, neutron 
sources are often created by combining plutonium and 
beryllium.  The alpha particles from the plutonium 
interact with the beryllium to generate the neutrons.  The 
third source comes from fissile material in substantial but 
subcritical quantities causing multiplication of neutrons 
which result in an increase in neutron radiation. 
 
The Type B package regulations, 10 CFR 71, provide 
radiation rate limits during Normal Conditions of 
Transport for the surface of a package (200 mrem/hr), 1 
meter from the surface of a package (10 mrem/hr), for the 
surface of the conveyance (200 mrem/hr) and 1 meter 
from the surface of the conveyance (10 mrem/hr) for 
exclusive use vehicles.  In addition, upon package closure 
a radiation dose measurement of the package is required 
for compliance verification, and a survey of the 
conveyance is required prior to initiating the shipment.  
 
B. Subcriticality 
A nuclear criticality occurs when a sufficient quantity of 
fissile material in a proper configuration is assembled.  
The fissile isotopes per DOE G 421.1-1 are U-232, U-233, 
U-235, Pu-239, Pu-241.  Protection against a criticality 
include:  control of fissile mass, control of enrichment 
(e.g. fraction of U-235 in a uranium content), control of 
concentration ( often used with solutions), use of poisons 
(neutron absorbers), and control of moderation (light 
element materials such as water or graphite).  Package 
limits that protect against a criticality are based upon 
rigorous calculations whose methodology has been 
benchmarked against a relatively small set of very precise 
criticality experiments.  In addition, a bias is used in the 
calculations in order to provide for an acceptable margin 
of safety. 
 
The Type B package regulations specify that single units, 
single flooded units and arrays of packages be evaluated 
during Normal Conditions of Transport.  As a result of the 
array evaluation a Criticality Transport Index is computed.  
This Index is used to restrict the number of packages 
which may be shipped on a single conveyance. 
 
C.  Containment 
Containment of the radioactive material is the heart of 
package design and safety.  External loads on the 
packages are covered by the regulations (e.g. solar heat, 
cold, drop, puncture, crush, and fire).  Internal loads or 
conditions which could impair containment include 
pressurization, corrosion or galvanic reactions, excessive 
heat, and ignition of combustible gases.  The containment 
boundary and closure/sealing area of the package must be 
adequate at all times.   
 
Containment vessels are designed, fabricated, and 
inspected per ASME BPVC Section III Division 1 
Subsection NB.  Rigorous leak tests per ANSI N-14.1 are 
performed as part of an annual maintenance.  Each 
package upon closure is also leak tested, although not to 
the standards of the annual test, to ensure adequate 
assembly.     
   
III.  SINGLE ITEM PACKAGE LOADING 
 
Loading of single item contents into Type B drum 
packages is routine within the DOE Complex.  For 
example, the DOE-STD-3013 provides for a container to 
be used for 50 year plutonium storage, and the 9975 
package is certified to transport a single 3013 container.  
This example will be used to qualitatively evaluate the 
potential safety concerns with transporting a single 
content item, namely a 3013 container, in the 9975 
package.  However, the concepts discussed are generally 
applicable to other packages. 
 
A.  Shielding 
The radiation dose rate on the 3013 will generally be 
known prior to loading and closure of the 9975.  Cans 
with high neutron dose rates are susceptible to regulatory 
non-compliance as the 9975 has no neutron shielding.  
Since the radioactive material has been stabilized prior to 
packaging, there is little concern about generating 
secondary radiation during transport which is not already 
present during package loading.  Similarly, minimal 
subcritical multiplication of neutrons is anticipated during 
transport than is already present at the time of package 
closure, even when an array of packages is shipped.  Since 
several 9975 packages are shipped per conveyance the 
radiation dose rates of the conveyance must be carefully 
checked to ensure compliance. 
 
B.  Subcriticality 
It is very difficult to imagine a situation where a criticality 
does not occur until the 9975 package is closed and the 
shipment commences.  A criticality event involving 
overbatch of a single 3013 would likely occur when the 
overbatch occurs or during staging in the facility where 
the 3013 is produced.  As expected, the fissile mass per 
3013 container is strictly controlled.  Typically, the total 
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content mass is precisely measured using an accurate 
scale.  For the 9975 package there are no special controls 
involving neutron poisons.  The interaction of an array of 
9975 containers indicates that no more than 25 can be 
placed on a single conveyance, even though an infinite 
array of packages has been shown to remain subcritical.  
An array of overbatched 3013 containers has not been 
evaluated.   
 
C.  Containment 
For material packaged in 3013 containers, pressurization, 
corrosion, and generation of flammable gases have all 
been thoroughly evaluated.  The 9975 has a very robust 
containment vessel designed to 800 psig per ASME BPVC 
Section III Division 1 Subsection NB.  One source of 
pressurization would be a sudden change in content 
temperature such that adsorbed moisture is released.  This 
scenario was evaluated as part of the Hypothetical 
Accident Conditions.  Corrosion is very unlikely to be a 
concern since the material has been stabilized.  Ignition of 
combustible gases remains an elusive topic for evaluation.  
Bounding analyses often yield wild estimations of 
potential hydrogen generation rates and amounts.  A 
comprehensive and reliable model for predicting hydrogen 
generation does not yet exist [2].  The final area of 
consideration is heat generation.  Isotopes Pu-238 and Pu-
240 and Am-242 are alpha emitters with relatively high 
specific activities (especially Pu-238).  The 9975 is 
certified for up to 19 watts.  The containment vessel and 
o-ring seal (400oF continuous service) have temperature 
limits.  The lead shielding (melting temperature 
approximately zzzF) and overpack material (degradation 
temperature approximately 300oF) also have temperature 
limits.  Thermal overbatching is most likely to occur due 
to assuming an incorrect  isotopic distribution.  The 
isotopics are typically measured as part of a broader assay 
program.  In general gross failures, such as at least one 
order of magnitude, would have to occur in order to 
exceed critical package temperature limits such as the o-
ring service temperature.    
 
IV.  MULTIPLE ITEM PACKAGE LOADING 
 
Package failures due to loading multiple items are much 
more likely to occur than failures due to loading single 
items.  Care must be taken to accurately sum quantities 
such as fissile mass, moderator, heat generation, and 
radiation dose rates.  The certification process requires 
such an evaluation, however recall that the focus here is 
on an overbatch occuring during loading where the 
contents is non-compliant resulting in unforseen 
interactions among the items.  A more complex example 
of a potential package failure is where materials are 
loaded together within a package, however at the time of 
package closure confinement barriers, which are typically 
not credited during transport, serve to keep the material 
apart.  During transport failure of the confinement barriers 
occurs and the materials mix.  Potential hazards from such 
mixing include increased radiation, chemical reactions, 
and nuclear criticality.        
 
A.  Shielding 
The potential for additive effects from loading multiple 
containers which exceed package dose rate limits is 
worthy of consideration.  Not only are primary radiation 
fields additive, but interactions which lead to secondary 
radiation must also be considered.  This is especially true 
if the items to be shipped together were not staged 
together in the facility prior to package loading.  The 
greatest risk could occur if cans of radioactive materials 
among approved content envelopes are mixed.  For 
example, a package may be certified for two different 
content envelopes.  One for Pu-239 and another one for a 
Pu-Be neutron sources.  However, a shipper may 
incorrectly conclude that material from both envelopes 
may be shipped together.  The subcritical multiplication 
from the Pu-239 combined with the neutron source could 
result in a neutron radiation field above the regulatory 
limits.  
 
B.  Criticality 
An overbatch of fissile mass in a shipping package is most 
likely to occur during loading of multiple items, especially 
if the items were not staged together in the facility.  The 
fissile mass limits for Pu-239 metal are low enough that it 
is credible to consider a scenario where two subcritical 
masses are loaded together in the shipping pacakge.  This 
criticality event would occur nearly instantly during 
package loading once the items were brought together.  
Another scenario of interest is an overbatched package 
that remains subcritical until package flooding occurs.    
 
C. Containment 
Containment failure could be facilitated by a thermal 
overbatch of a package.  The shipper must ensure that the 
heat generation from each of the content items is properly 
accounted for and summed to a value below the certified 
limit for the package.  Another potential failure scenario is 
due to reactions among the content items, especially after 
a convenience can failure.  For example, wet or moist 
plutonium or uranium oxide powder shipped with uranium 
or plutonium metal could readily lead to hydrogen 
generation.  Again, the problem arises from 
inappropriately loading together items from different 
content envelopes (i.e. metal and oxide). 
 
V.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
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The qualitative failure analysis presented is intended to 
identify the most critical content attributes.  A graded 
approach which emphasizes these attributes could be 
developed and used to form the basis of ensuring package 
safety through contents compliance.  Likewise, a 
mechanism should be established to allow packaging 
design agencies to evaluate less critical attributes, similar 
to the current practice of permitting minor manufacturing 
deviations to be evaluated by the packaging design agency, 
without involvement of the national competent authority. 
 
For all package loadings the critical attributes are:  
stabilized material that is not subject to change (e.g. 
chemical, physical form) during transport, fissile mass or 
radioactive material mass, and heat generation.  Also, any 
other credited criticality control (e.g poisons inherent in 
the contents such as Pu-240) is considered to be a critical 
attribute.  For multiple item package loadings evaluation 
of fissile mass and heat generation requires additional 
rigor as the materials may be brought together for the first 
time during package loading.  Additionally, care must be 
taken to ensure the items are within the same approved 
content envelope.  A simple and effective method for 
protecting against such a failure is to determine the total 
amount of each radionuclide to be shipped in the same 
package and compare this value against the limit in the 
content envelope (e.g. mass of U-235, U-238, Pu-238, Pu-
239, Pu-240, Pu-241 and Pu-242). 
 
The critical attributes should be identified as package 
limits by the national competent authority and presented 
as such in the package certificate of compliance.  A listing 
of non-critical attributes, those used as bounding 
assumptions in the safety evaluation, should also be 
provided in the certificate.  The package design agency 
should be allowed to evaluate content deviations of non-
critical attributes without formal involvement of the 
national competent authority.          
 
VI.  CONCLUSIONS 
 
A qualitative evaluation of hypothesized radioactive 
material package failures due to content non-compliance 
has been performed to identify content attributes critical to 
package safety.  Both single item and multiple item 
contents have been evaluated.  The authors recommend 
that the limits for the critical attributes be specifically 
called out in the package certificate.  Limits for other less 
critical attributes which were used as input to the 
transportation safety evaluation should be identified in the 
certificate, however package design agencies should be 
allowed to evaluate and approve shipment of contents 
beyond such limits. 
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